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Abstract   
Changes in educational participation rates across cohorts are likely to imply changes in 
the ability-education relationship and thereby to impact on estimated returns to education. 
We show that skewness in the underlying ability distribution is a key determinant of the 
impact of graduate expansion on the college wage premium. Calibrating the model 
against the increased proportion of university students in Britain, we find that changes in 
the average ability gap between university students and others are likely to have 
mitigated demand-side forces. 
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1. Introduction 
Changes over cohorts in the proportions of young people at given levels of educational 
attainment will impact on average ability gaps by educational level, influencing the bias 
in estimated returns to education associated with the omission of ability. If the magnitude 
of bias is changing over time, it is correspondingly more difficult to draw legitimate 
inferences on the trends in returns to education from a series of cross-section snap-shots.  
 Consider the case of the college wage premium, defined as the difference in wage 
rates between college and high school graduates. Suppose that all individuals are either 
college graduates ( 1c = ) or high school graduates ( 0c = ) and that we can write wages, 
w , as a function of ability, a , and c : 
0 1 2w c aβ β β ε= + + + ,       (1) 
where ε  is a stochastic error term. Ability is typically not observed in the data and hence 
the OLS estimator,  1βˆ , will be upward biased. Differentiating (1) with respect to c : 
1 2
dw da
dc dc
β β ⎡ ⎤= + ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ .        (2) 
The total effect of college on wages comprises the true effect plus an omitted variable 
bias term which depends on the magnitude of both (i) the true effect of ability on wages, 
2β , and (ii) the average ability gap between those with and those without a college 
education, /da dc .  
 The substantial literature on how the college wage premium, in the US and 
elsewhere, has changed over time focuses on changes in 1β  and 2β  (see Cawley et al., 
2000, and Taber, 2001); instead, we focus on the role of changes in /da dc . Blackburn 
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and Neumark (1991, 1993) addressed the issue of whether increases in college 
matriculation in the US in the 1980s could explain a rising college wage premium 
through changes in ability composition by educational level. They found that the likely 
effects were in the opposite direction to the empirical evidence. In contrast, Rosenbaum 
(2003) finds evidence that ability composition changes are capable of explaining a 
substantial proportion of the increase in the US college wage premium between 1969 and 
1989.  
 This paper attempts to make two contributions: first, we extend the existing 
theoretical analysis by identifying the crucial role of the skewness of the underlying 
ability distribution and, second, we provide a calibration of the model to offer insights 
into the behaviour over time of the college wage premium in the UK. 
 
2. Skewness in the ability distribution 
Blackburn and Neumark (1991, 1993) have shown that an increase in the proportion of 
college graduates in the population will lead to a reduction in the college wage premium 
under either a normal distribution or a symmetric triangular distribution of ability, so long 
as college graduates are in a minority in the population. In extending the Blackburn-
Neumark model, we highlight the importance of skewness in the ability distribution for 
the impact on ability bias arising from an increase in the number of college graduates.  
Consider the triangular distribution, on the unit support, characterized by different 
degrees of skewness, m . As 1/ 2m < , 1/ 2m >  or 1/ 2m = , the distribution is positively-
skewed, negatively-skewed or symmetric, respectively; see Figure 1, for 1/ 2m < , where: 
( ) ( )2 1 / 1    
( )   
2 /                     
a m a m
f a
a m a m
− − ≥⎧⎪= ⎨ <⎪⎩
.    (3) 
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(i) Case 1. First we consider the case in which the distribution is positively skewed 
( 1/ 2m < ) with 1g m< −  and  Ha m> . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1    Case 1: Positive skewness with 1g m< −  and  Ha m> . 
ˆCa  denotes the ability of the marginal investor in college education; Ca  ( Ha ) is the 
average ability of college (non-college) graduates; and g  is the proportion of the cohort 
who graduate from college. By construction, m  denotes the proportion of the distribution 
below the mode. The difference between the average ability of college and non-college 
graduates is given by: 
C H
da a a
dc
= − .  (4) 
The median ability of college graduates,  Ca , is such that: 
( ) ( )( )
1 1 1
. .
1 2
2
C Ca a
a ga da da
m
f −= =−∫ ∫ .   (5) 
It follows that: 
f  
2  
2
1 m−  
a  
1
m  
0  
m  Ha  Ca
2
g
2
g
1
2
g−1
2
g−  
2 / m  
ˆCa
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 ( )21 1
1 2C
ga
m
− =− ,  (6) 
and hence: 
 
( )1
1
2C
g m
a
−= − .  (7) 
Similarly, for Ha : 
 ( ) ( )21 1 1 1. 1
1 2 2HH
g gf a da a ga m
− += − = + =−∫ , (8) 
which implies that: 
 
( )( )1 1
1
2H
g m
a
+ −= − .  (9) 
From (7) and (9), it follows that: 
 { } 11 2C Hnda ma a g gdc −= − = + − , (10) 
in which case: 
 ( )
11 1 0
2 21
g gd da m
dg dc g g
⎧ ⎫− + −⎪ ⎪⎡ ⎤ = <⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
. (11) 
Hence, with relatively strong positive skewness such that 1g m< −  and  Ha m> , a rise 
in the proportion of college graduates within the cohort causes a fall in the premium 
attaching to a degree.  
 
(ii) Case 2 Consider now the case depicted in Figure 2, where the ability distribution is 
sufficiently negatively skewed that 1g m> −  and Ca m< . In contrast to Case 1,  a rise in 
g  will increase the average ability gap between college and high school graduates.  
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Figure 2    Case 2: Negative skewness with 1g m> −  and  ua m< . 
 
For Case 2, we can use similar methods to those outlined for Case 1 in order to obtain: 
( )2
2C
g m
a
−=    (12) 
and 
( )1
2H
g m
a
−= .   (13) 
From (12) and (13), it follows that: 
{ }2 1 2C Hda ma a g gdc = − = − − −  (14) 
and hence that: 
( )( )
2 11 0
2 22 1
g gd da m
dg dc g g
⎧ ⎫− − −⎪ ⎪⎡ ⎤ = >⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ − −⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
. (15) 
f  
2  
a  
1
0  mHa  Ca
2 / m  
ˆCa
1 g−  
2
1 m−  
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Thus, for this case of a sufficiently negatively skewed distribution, a rise in g  causes an 
increase in the premium for a degree.  
 
(iii) Case 3    We now consider the intermediate case in which g  and m  are such that 
H Ca m a< < . In this case, Ca  will is given by equation (7), while the value of Ha  will be 
equal to that shown in equation (13). Combining these, it follows that: 
( ) ( ){ }1 2 1 1
2C H
da a a m g g m
dc
= − = − − − − , (16) 
and hence: 
 
( )( )
( )
0   if 1
 
0   if 1
1 11 =          
2 2 1
g m
g m
gm g md da
dg dc g g
< < −
> > −
⎡ ⎤ ⎧− − − ⎪⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥ ⎨⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ − ⎪⎩⎣ ⎦
 . (17) 
Together with (11) and (15) for Cases 1 and 2, respectively, (17) establishes the result 
captured in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1    In the case of the uni-modal triangular distribution, the premium for the 
possession of a degree is decreasing (increasing) in the proportion with a degree if  
1g m< −  ( 1g m> − ). 
In other words, whether the degree premium is falling or rising in the proportion, 
g , depends solely on the relative size of g  and 1 m− . For given m , the premium will 
fall (rise) as g  rises if g  is relatively small (large). For given g , the premium is more 
likely to be falling in g , at the margin, the smaller is m : that is, the more positively 
skewed is the ability distribution. Notice one corollary of the analysis, which may have 
particular empirical relevance; while small increases in g  might be associated with a 
falling college wage premium – consistent with the Becker Woytinsky lecture hypothesis 
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(Becker, 1975) – this need not always hold as, if g  rises beyond a critical point, given by 
1g m= − , further increases in g  will lead to a rising premium for a degree. This is more 
plausible the larger is m : that is, the less positively skewed is the ability distribution. 
Our analysis identifies the extent of the skewness of the underlying ability 
distribution as a key determinant of the behaviour of the college wage premium, showing 
the knife-edge sensitivity to the extent of skewness relative to the size of g . It is likely 
that in more general single-peaked distributions, for which the uni-modal triangular 
distribution is just a linear approximation, second and higher order derivatives will 
influence over the properties of the model – though these are likely to be of lower order 
importance compared to the significance of the skewness property we have isolated.  
 
3.      Calibration 
Evidence for the UK suggests that despite increases in the relative demand for more 
highly educated workers, the estimated college wage premium showed little, if any, 
tendency to increase during the late 1980s and 1990s (see Walker and Zhu, 2008). 
Similarly, Bratti et al. (2008) find that, for men, the college wage premium for those born 
in Britain in 1970 (and typically graduating in the early 1990s) is no different to that for 
those born in 1958 (and graduating around 1980): for women, the premium fell 
considerably. Over time, the college participation rate1 was rising dramatically: from 
about 15% for the 1958 cohort to 30% for the 1970 cohort (source: DfES, 2003). An 
explanation for the absence of a clear skill-biased demand-side influence on the estimated 
college wage premium is the possibility that the increase in the proportion of the cohort 
attending college produced changes in relative ability composition and hence affected the 
                                                 
1 More usually referred to as the higher education participation rate in the UK 
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extent of ability bias. Our analysis suggests that if 1g m< − , then a rise in g  will lead to 
a reduction in ability bias, ceteris paribus, thus producing a lower estimate for the size of 
the college wage premium and hence offsetting any positive demand-side forces. We now 
develop numerical predictions for the change in /da dc  from a calibrated version of the 
model, inputting values of g  for the 1958 and 1970 British birth cohorts and considering 
various values of m .2 
 We set 0.15g =  for the 1958 birth cohort and 0.30g = for the 1970 birth cohort. 
In Table 1, we calibrate /da dc  for Case 1 and find that, for all values of m  which satisfy 
this case, the average ability gap between those with and those without a college 
education falls by about 14%. This is not a trivial change, though the extent to which this 
might impact on estimates of the college wage premium will depend on the return to 
ability. In Table 2, we consider a calibration for Case 3, the intermediate case.3 In this 
case, when the distribution is symmetric the doubling in g  is associated with an 11% fall 
in the average ability gap – similar to that in Case 1. However, as the distribution 
becomes increasingly negatively-skewed, the extent of the fall in the gap diminishes 
until, for 0.8m = , the impact of the increase in g  is a (small) rise in the gap. As g  
grows further – as has been the case in the UK – it becomes more likely that a rise in g  
might lead to an increase in the average ability gap. 
 
3.   Conclusions 
We have demonstrated the critical role of skewness in the distribution of ability in 
determining the impact of changing educational participation on the relationship between 
                                                 
2 In further work, we address the issue of whether differential levels and changes in university participation 
by gender might explain observed differences in the college wage premium by gender over time. 
3 Note that, given the values of g , no values of m  satisfy the conditions under which Case 2 is feasible.  
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ability and education and hence on estimated returns to education, focusing on the college 
wage premium and graduate expansion. We have also examined a calibration of the 
model for the British birth cohorts of 1958 and 1970 and shown how the extent of 
changes in the average ability gap between university students and others varies under 
alternative assumptions regarding skewness. We find that unless the distribution is quite 
strongly negatively-skewed, the observed increase in the proportion of the cohort 
graduating is capable of generating a reduction in the average ability gap of at least ten 
percent, thereby potentially mitigating the effects of demand-side forces on the college 
wage premium. 
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Table 1: Calibration based on Case 1, 1g m< −  and  Ha m> . 
Case 1 
g 
 1958 
g 
1970 m 
/da dc  /da dcΔ  
 
/da dcΔ  
(%) 
        
  0.15  0.1 0.46   
  0.15  0.2 0.43   
  0.15  0.3 0.41   
   0.3 0.1 0.40 -0.06 -14.0 
   0.3 0.2 0.37 -0.06 -14.0 
   0.3 0.3 0.35 -0.05 -14.0 
 
 
 
Table 2: Calibration based on Case 3, H Ca m a< < . 
Case 3 
g 
 1958 
g 
1970 m 
/da dc  /da dcΔ  
 
/da dcΔ  
(%) 
        
  0.15  0.5 0.35   
  0.15  0.6 0.32   
  0.15  0.7 0.30   
 0.15  0.8 0.29   
   0.3 0.5 0.31 -0.04 -10.9 
   0.3 0.6 0.30 -0.03 -7.8 
  0.3 0.7 0.29 -0.01 -3.8 
   0.3 0.8 0.30 0.00 1.1 
 
 
 
